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In January 2021, the South Sudanese government
announced the long-awaited Hybrid Court to bring
accountability to the country’s con ict and purported war
crimes. Researcher Abraham Diing talks to former
soldiers, civil servants, youth groups and community
elders in South Sudan to understand responses to the
announcement,  nding a mix of scepticism and concern
for in amed ethnic divisions.
This post is part of a series exploring ‘public
authority’ based on research at LSE’s Centre for Public
Authority and International Development at the Firoz Lalji
Centre for Africa.
On the 30 January 2021, the government of South Sudan  nally
agreed to form the Hybrid Court, as stipulated in the 2015
Agreement on the Resolution of the Con ict in the Republic of
South Sudan (ARCSS) and the 2018 Revitalized ARCSS. The
court was one of the mechanisms proposed to deal with past
abuses committed during more than six years of con ict in the
country, alongside the Commission for Truth, Healing and
Reconciliation (CTHR), and the Compensation and Reparations
Authority (CRA).
The move was quickly welcomed by the international
community. For example, the African Union Commission’s
Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, sees the agreement as
putting ‘an end to the delays in establishing the court,
transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing
institutions in order to bring justice and healing to all South
Sudanese.’ Similarly, South Sudanese researchers like Nyagoah
Tut Pur view the move as ‘a glimmer of hope for South Sudan’s
victims’. This announcement also generated debates on the
ground among ordinary people.
To assess these views and uncover what people think of the
court, I conducted interviews and focus group discussions in
Juba, Bor and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites in Bor. I
spoke with former Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA)
soldiers, youth groups, community elders, civil servants and
active soldiers. The  ndings described below present mixed
reactions towards the Hybrid Court. Broadly speaking, there is
high apprehension and scepticism about the government’s
ability to allow the court to successfully operate and, equally,
the court’s ability to bring perpetrators of abuses to justice.
‘I know the commander whose soldiers killed my father,
brother and my cousin, I know his family where they live in
Juba. If the hybrid court gives him justice for other abuses
and I don’t get justice I am coming after him and his family.
I let it go because killing him and his family will not bring
my relatives back but if he gets justice and I don’t then it is
another matter.’ 
– A Dinka man and former SPLA soldier in Juba, South
Sudan.
Forgiveness and reconciliation over opening
old wounds
The majority of South Sudanese are tired of war, and many I
spoke to believe the Hybrid Court will create another ethnic
con ict. Everyone knows the SPLA-In Government, SPLA-In
Opposition, various militias factions, different ethnic groups
and their allied militias have committed different kinds of
crimes and abuses. But few believe the court is going to
identify the victims and perpetrators.
The simple argument I heard repeated was that everyone is a
victim and a perpetrator. Most South Sudanese societies prefer
forgiveness and reconciliation among warrying parties over
individual punishment. In a society where revenge is a norm
and where everybody knows who committed which atrocities,
the Hybrid Court cannot be an appropriate approach for
transitional justice during the current, delicate situation.
‘In 1991, when SPLA- Nasir came to my village and wiped out
everything including my husband and son, I was angry and I am
still angry, will the hybrid court give me justice?’ 
– A widow of 1991 SPLA-Nasir’s Bor Massacre, Bor, South
Sudan.
‘If we go to the ballot box today, I’ll vote President Salva Kiir
out, he has failed our country, he has instituted hatred,
corruption, he has neglected our freedom  ghters, our
veterans, he has abandoned widows and orphans of liberation,
he has destroyed our SPLM, our legacy. But if someone comes
after him, hybrid court or anyone else, I will die  rst because he
did protect me when I had no one. He fought for our country
side by side with our Dr John Garang de Mabior. He is South
Sudan, SPLM, Garang and Beny e Jieng, ‘a Dinka leader’. He
cannot be humiliated when we are alive, it is impossible.’ 
– An assessment of the hybrid court by a former child soldier
in Bor, South Sudan.
Putting the cart before the horse
Other people I spoke to asked how a government that presides
over broken institutions, run by ethnic mercenaries, and which
have lost legitimacy, will be able to see the court properly
established. Surely, they argued, this makes a mockery of the
victims and their families – a clear indication that transitional
justice supporters and friends of South Sudan have no real
desire to help the country.
Even if the court is established, people in government and
among the grassroots are asking which atrocities the court will
address. The ones committed in 2013? The ones committed in
1991? The ones committed by warlords? The ones committed
by various ethnic militias? Who will be held accountable and
who is going to trial them are pertinent questions. A Dinka, a
Nuer, an Equatorian?
‘I fought Riek’s SPLA-Nasir in 1991 and I also fought Riek’s
forces in 2013, I know exactly what happened. If I have
authority, I will shut down the hybrid court because it is going
to open wounds that cannot be closed.’ 
– An interview with a South Sudan People Defense Force
soldier in Juba.
Answers risk the formation of alliances among the
perpetrators, especially those currently in government, and
plunging the country into fratricidal con icts before the court’s
sessions even begin. Already there are suspicions among
those I consulted that the government and opposition are
keeping the country in war so that they can remain in power.
Some believed that the Hybrid Court will give these actors
more reasons to cling on to power and avoid accountability.
The need for elections in South Sudan
People are aware of the situation in the country; they know
what happened during periods of con ict; they know about the
abuses committed; they know the victims and the perpetrators.
The idea that some will be punished worries many because it
is rarely acceptable to isolate an individual from his/her ethnic
group. Furthermore, people will always protect their own, guilty
or not, and this closing of ranks often leads to cycles of ethnic
con icts. For people in South Sudan, the path to stability and –
maybe in the future – accountability is through elections.
To a former SPLA soldier I spoke to, the best approach is to let
South Sudanese elect a leader who will open a path for
transitional justice and, consequently, stability. As far as the
civil population is concerned, the current leadership in Juba
have lost trust and legitimacy.
‘I was shot four times in various Dinka-Nuer con icts, they
killed my relatives, we killed their relatives, now we are living
and eating together despite the atrocities we committed
against each other. I am worried about the opening of the
wounds because the so-called hybrid court will not provide
justice to everyone; it will never  nd out the real truth.’
– Interview with a former SPLA soldier in Bor.
‘Now is not the right time for the hybrid court,  nd us a way to
choose our leader and stop trying to come after President Kiir
because it can be messy.’ 
– Interview with a retired SPLA soldier in Juba.
Reconciliation without punishment
While the court’s potential is being romanticised in Juba, the
grassroots is dreaming of an approach to peace that supports
forgiveness, reconciliation and healing. People I spoke with
argued it will be di cult to bring accountability when many
perpetrators still hold positions of power, many powerful ethnic
militias are uncontained, the government has lost legitimacy
and the country remains divided along ethnic lines. For them,
the lack of authority and institutions to enforce law and order
will render the court ineffective.
‘Taking a nail hammer approach without a government that
people believe in is a mistake, because after the hybrid court
comes revenges, because no one will enforce law and order,
the hybrid court should be the last phase of transitional
justice.’ 
– Interview with a civil servant in Juba.
The Hybrid Court also lacks widespread understanding – seen
as foreign, which opens space for perpetrators in position of
power to manipulate it. Instead, people want an approach that
is familiar. A sense of justice among many South Sudanese,
especially the Dinka and the Nuer, is not about guilt and
punishment per se but reminding people of their social
obligations and responsibilities as members of society. That is
why in many cases across the country people come together
and agreed to stop con ict without calling for punishment.
Understanding justice from below
My respondents con rmed a common fear among many South
Sudanese: conventional wisdom views transitional justice
mechanisms as ineffective in a country where the government
presides over a broken system awash with arms, divided along
ethnic lines and lacking legitimacy. Hence, the international
community and peace partners need to pressure the
government to  rst address these issues through diplomatic
means, including restricting the movement of war criminals
and freezing their assets in neighbouring countries.
At the same time, the international community needs a better
understanding of South Sudanese society’s ideas of justice
through nuanced research among ordinary people. In addition,
support for local peace and reconciliation mechanisms run by
chiefs and churches could produce more substantive results
than top-down approaches. These public authorities still have
legitimacy among the population, including the youth that
engage in con icts organised by politicians.
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